

O P 151537Z JAN 09  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000  
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 004103

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2034  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [AO](#) [CG](#) [SF](#) [KN](#)

SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN SHIPMENT OF  
PROLIFERATION CONCERN

REF: A. 06STATE180512  
[1](#)B. 05STATE173768

Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney  
[1](#)E. O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)

#### SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (S) We have received information that a delegation from the North Korean weapons trading firm Korea Mining and Development Corporation, or KOMID, will travel to Sub-Saharan Africa. We believe, based on the timing, that this trip is likely related to a shipment en route to the region aboard the North Korean-flagged merchant vessel BI RO BONG. The BI RO BONG departed the North Korean port of Nampo on 13 December.

[1](#)2. (S) While the nature of the cargo is unknown, the travel of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the cargo in the region suggests that it is military-related. In the past, the USG has sanctioned KOMID for its material contributions to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The USG also has approached all nations with whom we have diplomatic relations to warn about KOMID's activities. (REF A). KOMID has also been involved in conventional arms trade. Cooperation with KOMID could result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions, including the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), on those entities involved.

#### ACTION REQUEST

[1](#)2. (S) Posts are instructed to approach appropriate level host nation officials to request that they refrain from doing any military-related business with KOMID. Posts also are instructed to request that host nation officials deny bunkering or other services to the BI RO BONG should it bunker in territorial waters or make a port call at host nation ports, unless the vessel agrees to an inspection.

Posts may draw from objectives and talking points/non-paper below.

#### OBJECTIVES

[1](#)3. (S) Posts should seek to achieve the following:

-- Discourage host nations from purchasing military-related items from North Korea in general and KOMID in particular.

-- Encourage host nations, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law, to prevent the transit of items that are in violation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER

14. (S//REL NAMIBIA AND DRC) Begin Talking Points/ Non-paper FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY:

-- We have received information that a delegation from North Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and Development Corporation (KOMID), is planning to travel to possibly Angola and/or THE DRC in mid-January. This travel is scheduled to coincide with the arrival of a shipment probably aboard the North Korean vessel M/V BI RO BONG.

-- The M/V BI RO BONG departed North Korea in mid-December. Its cargo and destination are currently unknown, though the travel of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the cargo in the region suggests that it is military-related.

-- Our information indicates that M/V BI RO BONG would likely deliver cargo at Angola and/or the DRC. M/V BI RO BONG could arrive at Walvis Bay, Namibia, on or about January 17, and at Matadi, the DRC, on or about January 22. Intermediate port calls in South Africa and Angola are also possible, as are port calls to other destinations.

-- While it is unclear whether BI RO BONG's cargo is conventional arms or WMD related, transfers of WMD-related or military items would raise serious questions of noncompliance with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore urge you to refrain from doing any military or WMD-related business with KOMID.

-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.

-- As part of this effort, we encourage you to discontinue any existing military trade with North Korea, refrain from purchasing military or dual-use equipment from the DPRK, and refrain from seeking any form of defense trade cooperation from Pyongyang.

-- Cooperation with KOMID could result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions, including the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), on those entities involved.

-- In addition, we would like to request that, should the BI RO BONG make a port call at your ports, or request bunkering or other services while in your territorial waters, that you either deny such services, or condition the provision of these services on requiring the vessel to be boarded for inspection.

-- Should the vessel submit to such an inspection, we ask that you share with us any details of the cargo or end-user that you obtain, and take appropriate actions to detain any cargo that might be in violation of UNSCR 1718.

END POINTS FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY

15. (S//REL ANGOLA) Begin Talking Points/Non-Paper for LUANDA ONLY:

-- We have received information that a North Korean vessel containing unspecified cargo, the BI RO BONG, could make a call at an Angolan port, or request bunkering or other services while in your territorial waters. Evidence suggests that the BI RO BONG may be delivering goods to various African ports of call on behalf of North Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and Development Corporation (KOMID). While it is unclear whether the BI RO BONG's cargo is conventional arms or WMD related, transfers of WMD-related or military items would raise serious questions of noncompliance with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore urge you to refrain from doing any military or WMD-related business with KOMID.

-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.

-- As partners in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), we appreciate any cooperation or information your government can provide regarding any possible port visit by the M/V BI RO BONG.

END POINTS FOR ANGOLA.

16. (U) REPORTING REQUIREMENT: Posts are requested to report the results of their efforts within seven days of receipt of this cable.

17. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Washington POC for follow-up is Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.

18. (U) Department thanks posts for their assistance. Please slug responses for AF, EAP, ISN, and T.  
RICE

NNNN

End Cable Text